American University Washington College of Law

Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of
Law
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic
Journals

Scholarship & Research

5-1-2012

Managing Expectations: Beyond Formal Adjudication
Susan Franck

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, International Law Commons, and the
International Trade Law Commons

Washington & Lee Public
Legal Studies Research Paper Series
Accepted Paper No. 2012-35
May 1, 2012

“Managing Expectations:
Beyond Formal Adjudication”

Prof. Susan D. Franck
Forthcoming chapter in Cambridge University Press book (Roberto Echandi, et al., eds. 2012)

Washington and Lee University School of Law - Sydney Lewis Hall – Lexington - VA – 24450

http://ssrn.com/abstract=http://ssrn.com/abstract=2049581

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2049581

DRAFT: DO NOT CIRCULATE, COPY, CITE,
DISTRUBTE OR REFER TO WITHOUT PERMISSION

MANAGING	
  EXPECTATIONS:	
  BEYOND	
  FORMAL	
  ADJUDICTION	
  
Susan D. Franck

∗

Recognizing that the proper balance of international investment law is an area of normative concern, the World
Trade Institute organized a panel to explore considerations
related to the appropriate equilibrium. Scholarship by Anne
van Aaken and Bart Legum offers an opportunity to consider investment law more systematically, namely by
considering different ways to achieve regulatory and commercial balance, to apportion discretion appropriately and
to manage expectations. This Commentary offers exploratory remarks that uses latent ideas from the van Aaken and
Legum papers to offer a lens for thinking systematically
about managing stakeholder expectations of the international investment system.
A critical issue for international investment law relates
to cognitive psychology and how to manage the expectations of differently situated stakeholders, particularly when
reality does not conform to presumed pre-existing baselines.
It is appropriate to think critically about what the baseline
expectations should be in international investment. Although there will be overlapping interests and opportunities
for joint gains, the expectations and needs of all stakeholders
will not necessarily always be in perfect alignment. This
means that stakeholders must manage their expectations to
avoid dissatisfaction when there is a possibility of either
inevitable or unexpected divergence.
There are different methods to manage stakeholder expectations and investment treaty conflict. One element of
expectation management involves education, which offers
basic information about international investment and its
derivative legal regime. Presumably, such information can
be used to make evidence-based normative choices that are
more informed about the relative costs and benefits.1 AnAssociate Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University School of Law.
The author is grateful for the research assistance of Washington & Lee University Law Library and Anaeli Sandoval.
1 Evidence-based approaches to legal norms and regulation are gaining in
popularity given the tangible value of the benefits. See, e.g., J.C. Oleson, Risk in
Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and Evidence-Based Sentencing, 64
SMU L. REV. 1329 (2001) (using evidence-based approaches to create greater
legitimacy in criminal sentencing); Sephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism
and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1093 (2009) (using an evidence-based approach to understand normative choices in property law);
Timothy S. Jost, Our Broken Health Care System and How to Fix It: An Essay on
∗

DRAFT – DRAFT – DRAFT – DRAFT – DRAFT – DRAFT

Electronic
Electroniccopy
copyavailable
availableat:
at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2049581
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2049581

MANAGING EXPECTATIONS: BEYOND FORMAL ADJUDICATION

other element involves recognizing different doctrinal opportunities to manage investment treaty conflict and related
regulatory discretion. To borrow concepts from administrative law for exploratory purposes, regulation of
international investment law can either occur through rulemaking procedures or adjudicative processes.2
Both authors explore this administrative law model, albeit in different ways. Legum’s paper offers a formal rulemaking perspective on international investment law that
considers opportunities for textual specification.
Van
Aaken’s paper, by contrast, explores how to capture regulatory discretion by focusing on formal adjudication. Despite
the differences, the commonality is that both papers focus
on formal regulatory activity.
Yet, state regulatory activity is nuanced. Regulation can
involve conduct that is more complex than the simple model
of formal adjudication and formal rulemaking. Rather, a
sophisticated view of state regulatory activity involves
formal and informal conduct. This suggests that there are
untapped opportunities for managing stakeholder expectations and regulatory discretion through structured informal
mechanisms—including informal rule-making and informal
adjudication.
The international investment system has thus far depended heavily on international arbitration as a formal
Health Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 537 (2006) (encouraging an evidence-based approach to health care reform to ensure ideology advances policy
objectives); Bernard Trujillo, Patterns in a Complex System: An Empirical Study of
Valuation in Business Bankruptcy Cases, 53 UCLA L. REV. 357, 363 n.17 (2005)
(“[A]n evidence-based law approach to doctrine can move us past anecdote and
unexamined path dependence, and perhaps toward a systematization and
verification of knowledge about legal doctrine.”). In international investment
law, it behooves scholars and stakeholders to take methodologically sound
empirical evidence seriously.
2 See CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 2:11 (3d
ed. 2010) (describing the difference between the adjudication and rulemaking
processes); see also Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 15–18 (2005) (proposing that global
governance can be understood by looking at administrative processes such as
rulemaking and adjudication); Benedict Kingsbury et al., U.S. Administrative Law:
A Model for Global Administrative Law?, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (2005)
(discussing the convergence of U.S. administrative law and “Global Administrative Law” and the application of administrative law to international regulatory
regimes).
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adjudicative system to provide guidance and clarification on
the standards contained in international investment agreements (IIAs). There has been dissatisfaction with this state
of affairs that has lead to calls for the wholesale abandonment or radical overhaul of the international investment
system. To prevent the baby from being thrown out with
the proverbial bathwater, it is critical to think about the
evidence in a realistic and balanced manner. This involves
first unpacking stakeholder expectations to promote rational
consideration of the evidence by: (a) recognizing where
expectations may have been overly optimistic, and then (b)
thinking thoughtfully and systematically about the mechanisms through which to capture and manage regulatory
discretion. In an effort to do so, the remainder of this Commentary will first consider the empirical and causal links
identified by van Aaken to think carefully about how to
encourage the purported benefits of IIAs. Second, the
Commentary then considers the inevitable tension among
incentives for rent-seeking by investors, the different regulatory goals of states and the hopes of civil society.
This Commentary ultimately suggests that formal adjudication has a critical place in the judicialization3 of
international investment law, yet there is value in moving
beyond primary reliance upon formal adjudication. Put
simply, there is real value in expanding the acceptable—and
necessary—methods of investment regulation. There should
be increased attention to formal codification of investment
rules at the front end and the express prioritization of competing investment values. Meanwhile, there should be
enhanced focus on the untapped value of structured—yet
informal—regulatory activity, including informal rulemaking and informal adjudication.

3 See Robert E. Hudec, The Judicialization of GATT Dispute Settlement, in IN
WHOSE INTEREST? DUE PROCESS AND TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 9
(Michael M. Hart & Debra P. Steger eds., 1992); David M. Trubek, Transcending
the Ostensible: Some Reflections on Bob Hudec as Friend and Scholar, 17 MINN. J. INTL.
L. 1, 3-4 (2008); Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Not Quite a World Without Trials: Why
International Dispute Resolution is Increasingly Judicialized, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 119,
119–24 (2006) (arguing that certain international disputes are increasingly
judicialized).
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I.	
  	
  Managing	
  Expectations	
  About	
  Investment	
  
The Washington Consensus was based upon the premise that international investment and development
objectives were necessarily aligned. A corollary assumption
was that foreign investment would yield a net positive
benefit for both the investor and the State.4
Yet, there have been concerns that the purported benefits of international investment are not supported by the
data. Whether the dysjunction between the expectation and
outcome derives from either a lack of information or cognitive processing errors that lead to the overestimation of
positive outcomes,5 the effect is the same. It is unrealistic to
assume that a causal chain will function every time, whereby: (1) signing an IIA will lead to investment, (2) the
investment will lead to growth, and (3) growth leads to
better quality of life for the population. At each step of that
causal chain, problems can arise.
There is not necessarily single uniform monolithic narrative of international investment that always results in a
happy outcome. Van Aaken is correct to urge caution lest
one be overly optimistic about the benefits of international
investment, and thereby be disappointed when reality di4 See generally THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED: TOWARDS A
NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Narcis Serra & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2008); see also
Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 427, 470 (2010) (“The Washington Consensus--the shared belief . . . that
increased investment, open economies, privatization, and economic deregulation
would result in increased global prosperity and economic development--was a
powerful force for the spread of investment treaties and the development of the
regime that they created.”); see also THEODORE H. MORAN, HARNESSING FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT: POLICIES FOR DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 72–74 (2006) (proposing a “build-up” approach which involves
greater liberalization of the economy and can be used by poorer developing
countries to harness FDI and development).
5 See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1524–25 (1998) (identifying
overoptimism as a common feature of human behavior which leads people to
think that their probability of a bad outcome is far less than others); DANIEL
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011) (exploring cognitive biases and
their effects in increasing peoples' perceived positive outcomes); DAN ARIELY,
PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS (2008)
(discussing the role cognitive biases play in everyday decision-making, counteracting the presumption that individuals make decisions based on rational
choice).
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verges from expectation. There are inevitably narratives of
success, horror stories, and still other situations where outcomes are mixed.
In other words, risks related to
international investment are complicated, and stakeholders
would do well to first think in a more nuanced way to better
manage expectations and promote better decisionmaking.
II.	
  Understanding	
  the	
  Causal	
  Link	
  between	
  IIAs	
  and	
  
Investment	
  
Data is a critical element of managing expectations and
disrupting of cognitive biases that lead to poor predictive
conclusions. This section therefore considers the value that
data can offer in evaluating the causal link between the
value of an IIA and derivative investment flows.
The first link in Van Aaken’s causal chain requires assessment of the value of entering into a treaty. The existing
empirical literature suggests there is a binary choice, with
two competing narratives, namely: (1) IIAs do facilitate
foreign investment,6 and (2) IIAs do not facilitate foreign
investment.7
Yet, recent research suggests the intriguing possibility
that the merits of signing an IIA are more nuanced than an
“either-or” dichotomy. Scholarship by Tobin and RoseAckerman8 suggests that there is sometimes a positive rela6 See Deborah L. Swenson, Why Do Developing Countries Sign BITS?, 12
U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 131, 152–55 (2005) (evaluating statistical information of BITs throughout the 1990’s, and concluding that countries that signed
BITs were rewarded with increased levels of foreign investment); UNCTAD,
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production
and
Development,
UNCTAD
(2011),
http://www.unctaddocs.org/files/UNCTAD-WIR2011-Full-en.pdf (detailing the year-to-year
growth of FDI flow around the world, and the increase of foreign investment
dollars being invested among various States).
7	
   See KARL P. SAUVANT & LISA E. SACHS, THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN
	
  
DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES,
AND INVESTMENT FLOWS (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., Oxford Univ. Press
2009) (analyzing data that looked at the most widely quoted studies, in order to
determine whether IIA’s are effective legal instruments in attracting foreign
investors, with the author’s conclusions varying from IIA’s having a strong effect
on international investment flow to IIA’s having no effect at all).	
  
8 Jennifer L. Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, When BITs Have Some Bite: The
Political-Economic Environment for Bilateral Investment Treaties, 6 REV. INT’L ORGAN.
1 (2011).

5
DRAFT: DO NOT CIRCULATE, COPY, CITE,
DISTRIBUTE OR REFER TO WITHOUT PERMISSION

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2049581

MANAGING EXPECTATIONS: BEYOND FORMAL ADJUDICATION

tionship between IIAs and investment flows; but the story is
typically complicated and without a universal narrative. In
particular, they suggest that IIAs are a complement to—not
a substitute for—the domestic regulation that facilitates
investment.9 Their empirical scholarship indicates that: (1)
political risk can moderate the efficacy of an IIA,10 and (2)
the presence of other IIAs can affect the benefits of a treaty.11
Similarly, recent scholarship by Jason Yackee analyzed
whether the presence of an IIA motivated international
investors’ investment decisions. He explained that “grandiose claims about the historically demonstrated ability of
[IIAs] to promote investment should be consumed with
caution. [IIAs] may influence certain investment decisions.”12
This recent and nuanced research provides credible evidence that the value of IIAs is not monolithic. Rather, IIAs
must be evaluated in nuanced way. Using a particularized
country-by-country and dyad-by-dyad understanding will
aid States in making more realistic and evidence-based
assessments of the value of IIAs. While this necessarily
means more complexity, it reflects real-world variance that
stakeholders ignore at their peril. Put simply, while IIAs can
lead to investment in certain circumstances, stakeholders
may need to decrease their expectations about the degree
and potential effect of IIAs so that they do not end up unnecessarily disappointed. They need to consider the likely
Id. at 28.
As political risk decreased, there were increases in investment. See id. at
21 (“Across all of the specifications, decreased political risk (a higher risk indicator) has
a positive impact on FDI flows . . . for each one point that a country improves on the
political risk scale, the impact of an additional BIT equates to a 1.1% increase in FDI
flows.”). In the examples Tobin & Rose Ackerman offered, this translated into
increased capital flow of US$1-1.2 million for every IIA signed. Id. at 22.
11 In the global competition for capital, the overall number of IIAs in a
country and world-wide may suppress the positive investment flow that might
otherwise be expected from an IIA. See id. at 17 (“As a country enters into
greater numbers of BITs, if other countries do so as well, any positive impact is
moderated by those other countries’ actions.”).
12 Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct
Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 397, 400 (2010);
see also Todd Allee & Clint Peinhardt, Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment
Treaties and Bargaining Over Dispute Resolution Provisions, 54 INT’L STUD. Q. 1
(2010) (exploring how differences variables, particularly treaty dispute resolution mechanisms, can implicate investment decisions).
9

10
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net benefit of “the grand bargain”13 and then consider how
to strategically maximize those benefits.
III.	
  	
  Alignment	
  of	
  Interest	
  in	
  Investment	
  
Even assuming all IIAs are reliably linked to increased
investment flows, it is not guaranteed that investment will
result in a positive development outcome. Another element
of managing expectations to avoid unnecessary dissatisfaction, involves systemic evaluation of the permutations of the
potential investment outcomes. While outcomes can theoretically be positive for host State development, the interests
of all stakeholders are not always in perfect alignment.14
Investors, States and civil society groups all have important roles to play in the evolution of international
investment law. As relevant stakeholders, their positions
should be evaluated to consider the scope of potential variations. While overly simplistic, even a simple model that
considers: (1) the experience of the three key sets of stakeholders,15 and (2) the potential outcomes of investment,16
demonstrates the realistic probability for divergence. Chart
1 provides a visual representation of this possibility. Presuming these different permutations are all equally
weighted, in only one out of eight options is there perfect
alignment between the effects of all interested stakeholders.
13 Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITS Really Work?: An
Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 67, 77 (2005).
14 See generally Erik Albæk, Knowledge, Interests and the Many Meanings of
Evaluation: A Developmental Perspective, 7 INT’L J. SOC. WELFARE 94, 97 (1998)
(discussing economic growth in the United States and acknowledging the
“increased [] awareness of the many stakeholders’ divergent substantial interests
as well as institutional interests”).
15 Future scholarship might undertake a more considered discussion about
the nuances of different types of stakeholders in the international investment
system. For the limited purposes of this exploratory essay, these three key
groups have been identified as making significant contributions to international
investment law.
16 For the limited purposes of this exploratory essay, this variable is discrete in that it creates a binary variable to demarcate a distinction between: (a)
positive investment outcomes, and (b) either neutral or negative investment
outcomes. Future scholarship might create a uniform variable for a more
nuanced evaluation of categories or even a scaled range of possible outcomes.
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Investor

State

Civil Society

Positive Effect
Positive Effect

Positive Effect
Positive Effect

Positive Effect

Neutral or Negative
Effect
Neutral or Negative
Effect
Neutral or Negative
Effect
Positive Effect

Positive Effect
Neutral or Negative
Effect
Neutral or Negative
Effect
Neutral or Negative
Effect
Positive Effect

Neutral or Negative
Effect
Neutral or Negative
Effect
Neutral or Negative
Effect
Neutral or Negative
Effect
Positive Effect

Positive Effect

Neutral or Negative
Effect
Chart 1: Matrix of Potential Investment Outcomes.

Positive Effect
Neutral or Negative
Effect
Positive Effect

This should be sobering to those who assume that international investment is always a positive evolution for all
stakeholders. It might even suggest that one should expect
systemic dissatisfaction with investment outcomes.
This is not to say that there will not be success stories.
Indeed, one would hope that investment choices are made
with the objective of providing sustainable commercial
opportunities for businesses, states and citizens. Yet, that
hope must be tempered with reality. Human beings have
cognitive predispositions to be overly optimistic and overconfident about the success of their ventures.17 After all, if
75% or more of the population presumes that they are better
than average drivers, at least 25% of the population must be
17 See Karl Schweizer et. al., Cognitive Bias of Optimism and Its Influence on
Psychological Well-Being, 84 PSYCHOL. REP. 627 (1999) (describing experiments
demonstrating individuals’ optimism bias and its effect).

8
DRAFT: DO NOT CIRCULATE, COPY, CITE,
DISTRIBUTE OR REFER TO WITHOUT PERMISSION

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2049581

MANAGING EXPECTATIONS: BEYOND FORMAL ADJUDICATION

wrong.18 If studies regularly demonstrate the risk of error
with something as basic as driving, simply consider the
degree of error that may be involved in something as complex as international investment law.
It is entirely possible that the mismanagement of expectations related to investment, normal cognitive biases and
information processing errors is part of the current dissatisfaction with the international investment regime. This
dissatisfaction, in turn, contributes to the efforts to reclaim
State regulatory authority and “policy space,” which José
Alavarez has called, “The Return of the State.”19
Unitary characterizations might require unitary solutions. Yet, the reality is: international investment flows and
development outcomes are complex and require complexity
to provide constructive solutions. Dissatisfaction with investment outcomes may not necessarily require simple
rejection or abandonment of the current IIA regime. There
may be more subtle and tailored opportunities to redress
perceived dissatisfaction. Stakeholders might be better
served by first recognizing that perfect alignment with the
social good of development will not necessarily be achieved
in equal levels for all groups. Beyond this, stakeholders
should consider that, more often than not, some stakeholder
will be dissatisfied at some point in the investment lifecycle.
The question then becomes: (1) how can stakeholder expectations best be managed, and (2) what should be done to
redress the inevitable dissatisfaction with the process given
the continuing need to facilitate both investment and economic development?
The next section explores these two related areas. First,
it considers how we might manage expectations by thinking
about the regulation of IIAs and development in a more
nuanced way. Second, it identifies additional areas for
18 The classic study by Baruch Fischoff found “[Seventy-five to ninety percent] of drivers believe that they are better than the average.” Baruch Fischhoff,
Cognitive Liabilities and Products Liability, 1 J. PROD. LIAB. 207, 212 (1977); see also
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, Paul
Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982); Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More
Skillful Than Our Fellow Drivers?, 47 ACTA PSYCHOL. 143, 146-47 (1981) (evaluating
perceived driving skill and finding a self-serving bias where people viewed
themselves more favorably (i.e. less risky and more skillful)).
19 José E. Alavarez, The Return of the State, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 223 (2011).
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structure regulatory authority. Finally, it suggests that
strategic choices of these different opportunities will create
better institutional balance in international investment law
that more properly manages expectations, promotes stakeholder choice, and hopefully increases satisfaction with
international investment and its regulation.
IV.	
  Systemic	
  Regulatory	
  Opportunities	
  
Global administrative law, or global regulatory law,
posits that there is a new administrative legal space that
exists beyond the traditional nation-state boundaries. Instead, rather than the traditionally public bodies exercising
regulatory conduct, a confluence of public, private, and
public-private hybrid actors perform key regulatory functions.20 Scholarship has begun to apply these concepts to
international investment law.21 Thinking about investment
law through this framework provides an opportunity for
systemic evaluation.

20 SANTIAGO MONTT, STATE LIABILITY IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION:
GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE BIT GENERATION (2009);
see also Nicko Kricksn & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Governance and
Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 3
(2006) (providing a detailed explanation of Global Administrative Law – how
administrative and regulatory functions are performed in a global context – and
providing examples of a number of different forms in which regulatory functions of global governance take place); Alex Mills, Antinomies of Public and Private
at the Foundations of International Investment Law and Arbitration, 14 J. INT’L ECON.
L. 469, 485-86, 489 (2011) (exploring how investment law’s use of arbitration can
be viewed as a law-making administrative process); Stephan W. Schill, SystemBuilding in Investment Treaty Arbitration and Lawmaking, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1083,
1101, 1107–08 (2011) (investigating regulatory functions outsourced by treaties
and its implications).
21 See Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a
Species of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 121 (2006) (explaining
four key features of investment treaties and how together, international investment arbitration best exemplifies global administrative law); see generally Montt,
supra note 20 (recognizing investment arbitration as a form of public law adjudication while trying to fill in the gaps regarding the political and legal
consequences of developing countries in investment treaties).
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A. The Framework of Global Administrative Law
Administrative law occurs primarily through rulemaking or adjudication. Both forms of regulation involve a
policy choice that has a normative application to the lives of
individuals. Adjudication is a more specific application of
law to an individualized context. Adjudication can involve,
for example, a judge or other third-party neutral adjudicating the facts before him or her in light of the applicable legal
regime. Rulemaking, by contrast, is more generalized. It
does, however, require the articulation of legal rules and,
potentially, interpretive guidelines or examples to guide the
application of the broader principles. These forms of administrative regulation can happen through both formal and
informal mechanisms.22 In theory, this means that there are
at least four categories of regulatory activity: (1) formal
rulemaking, (2) formal adjudication, (3) informal rulemaking, and (4) informal adjudication.
Currently, international investment law occurs almost
exclusively through a formal paradigm. Regulation starts
initially through the context of formal rulemaking. This
limited formal activity involves treaty drafting. It can also
take the shape of treaty renegotiation or the drafting of
interpretive statements issued by entities with designated
authority.23 These processes have created an international
law regime with broad standards concerning the treatment
of investment. Despite the formality of the rule creation
framework, there have been few clear articulations of individualized rules or textual explanations of how the
22 In the United States, for example, regulatory discretion operates through
the rubric of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) that sets the standards
through which regulatory discretion operates. See Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. §§ 500–596 (2000); see also 3 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND PRACTICE § 10:1 (3d ed. 2011) (providing a brief overview of the four fundamental processes of Administrative Law – formal and informal adjudication and
rulemaking); David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International
Administration, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 547 (2005).
23 For example, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Free
Trade Commission has issued an Interpretative Note. See NAFTA, Notes of
Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE CANADA (July 31, 2001), http://www.international.gc.ca/tradeagreements-accords-commerciaux/disp-diff/NAFTAInterpr.aspx?lang=en&view=d.
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regulatory regime should be applied. Given this gap, it is
perhaps no surprise that – to date – the majority of regulation in international investment law has occurred through
the context of formal adjudication. By virtue of both the
creation of broad standards and the treaty’s outsourcing of
the adjudicative function, international arbitrators have
become the de facto regulators of international investment
law.
This focus on formal regulation has benefits. First, it is a
move beyond the violence associated with gunboat diplomacy.24 Second, it provides a check on the unfettered discrediscretion of diplomacy and creates standards for evaluating
the merits of economic rights.25 Third, it promotes judicialization of economic rights and provides a chance for
enhanced predictability.26 Finally, placing regulatory decisions into the hands of neutral parties can prevent undue
politicization.27 Focusing on the expedient resolution of
economic rights in a neutral forum has the potential to deSee generally JAMES CABLE, GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY 1919-1991: POLITICAL APLIMITED NAVAL FORCE (3d ed. 1994) (giving background
information and the history of Gunboat Diplomacy); Fergus MacErlean, Argentina Launches Naval Campaign to Isolate Falkland Islands, THE TELEGRAPH (Dec. 5,
2011,
8:28
PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/falklandislands
/8936750/Argentina-launches-naval-campaign-to-isolate-Falkland-Islands.html
(discussing the naval campaigns Argentina has recently launched to isolate the
Falkland Islands which symbolizes a present day gun-boat diplomacy).
25	
   See Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a
Boon to the Legitimacy of International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 471, 480–81
(2009) (explaining why it is difficult for investors to enforce promises made by
host states as well as the drawbacks that weaken diplomatic protection in forcing
host states to comply with those promises); Andrea K. Bjorklund, Sovereign
Immunity as a Barrier to the Enforcement of Investor-State Arbitral Awards: The RePoliticization of International Investment Disputes, 21 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 211 (2010)
(discussing how the sovereign immunity laws of a specific state plays a role in
preventing investors from enforcing a judgment against the host state).
26 See supra note 3 at 9 (discussing the legalization international economic
law).
27	
   See IBRAHIM F. I. SHIHATA, TOWARD A GREATER DEPOLITICIZATION OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES: THE ROLES OF ICSID AND MIGA, IN INVESTING WITH
CONFIDENCE: UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL RISK MGT. IN THE 21ST CENTURY 2–35
(Kevin W. Lu et al. eds., 2009) (discussing how international investment disputes
has evolved through the years, from politicized disputes requiring the exercise
of diplomatic protection and use of force, to the formation of organizations that
offer a forum for conflict resolution and depolitization of investment disputes).
24
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crease economic risk and increase investment—hopefully
with the concomitant objectives of development.
Nevertheless, exclusive reliance on formal regulation
has costs. Such reliance ignores the value potentially derived from thinking systemically about informal regulatory
regimes. This means that value is either potentially left on
the table or otherwise lost. Moreover, the current system is
heavily skewed towards only one form of regulation—
formal adjudication. This has certain negative implications.
First, as arbitrators are not necessarily from the State or
States involved in the IIA, this creates concerns related to a
potential democracy deficit.28 Second, the fragmented nature of the adjudicative regime can create challenges in
generating a stable and predictable system.29 This lack of
predictability may, in turn, create negative externalities for
the efficacy of investment law and the economic value derived from IIAs. Third, the abundance of discretion related
to the application, can give rise to concerns related to abuse
of discretion or improper interpretation.30 Finally, the nearly exclusive outsourcing of regulatory authority to non-State
actors raises concerns about the proper balance of State
authority and the rights of individuals or corporations.31
28 See Ilhyung Lee, Practice and Predicament: The Nationality of the International Arbitrator (with Survey Results), 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 603, 604 (2008)
(discussing how the practice of national neutrality is widely followed and parties
commonly insist that the arbitrator be a national of a country other than those of
the parties).
29 Charles N. Brower, The Evolution of the International Judiciary: Denationalization Through Jurisdictional Fragmentation, 103 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 171, 184
(2009) (illustrating the potential for the fragmentation of the international legal
system through the poignant example of the conflict between the ICTY and ICJ
over legal doctrine, giving rise to disparate results depending on which tribunal
was viewing the problem).
30 See David Schneiderman, Judicial Politics and International Investment
Arbitration: Seeking an Explanation for Conflicting Outcomes, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. &
BUS. 383, 405 (2010) (discussing inconsistent Argentinean arbitration awards,
based upon identical or similar facts, in order to try and shed light on the
process of arbitral decision-making); Jan Paulsson, Moral Hazard in International
Dispute Resolution, 25 ICSID REV. 339, 343–47 (2010) (illustrating the possibility of
improper arbitrator activity by reference to anecdotal information).
31	
   See Suzanne A. Spears, The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation of
International Investment Agreements, 13(4) J. INT’L ECON. L. 1037, 1072–73 (discussing the new generation of IIAs and the attempts to balance private adjudication
and public policy).	
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These concerns are no small matters and are, perhaps, contributing to the current backlash against investment treaty
arbitration.32
B. Exploring Untapped Value
The focus on formal adjudication has consequences. It
both undervalues the possible role for formal rule-making
and leaves potential value of informal regulatory activity
untouched. This outcome suggests three things. First, the
status quo may necessitate a rebalancing of the regulatory
pendulum to focus on complimentary or complete alternatives to capture regulatory discretion. Second, it necessitates
stakeholders making more informed and systemic choices
about where they choose to place regulatory discretion.
Finally, any adjustments in stakeholders’ approaches to the
management of investment risk have the capacity to more
adequately manage expectations about the role of investment and the role of state authority. Put simply, in the
investment context, optimism must be met with realism;
realism requires re-assessment of the most appropriate
method(s) for regulating international investment; and
stakeholder expectations should be tempered accordingly.
C. Formal Rulemaking
One of the most critical areas of untapped value is formal rulemaking. Utilizing formal rulemaking capacity
could take a variety of forms.
In the first instance, it could require greater particularization of international investment rules. In their current
shape, the broad standards in international investment
treaties provide minimal guidance of the shape of the law
See MICHAEL WAIBEL ET AL., THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBIPERCEPTIONS AND REALITY (Michael Waibel eds., 2010) (discussing the
current backlash, both procedural and substantive, against investment arbitration, through a multitude of viewpoints concerning the present state of
investment arbitration within the larger international legal regime); see also Asha
Kaushal, Revisiting History: How the Past Matters for the Present Backlash Against
the Foreign Investment Regime, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 491 (2009) (giving a historical
perspective on the backlash against international investment law and arbitration). 	
  
32
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and its application. Given the academic quagmire of the
rules versus standards debate33 and vague treaty standards
outsourcing interpretation, the adjudicative capture of regulatory authority is not surprising. States may, therefore, be
well served by reclaiming their regulatory space by providing greater detail in the text of their investment treaties.
Such detail need not only include more specificity regarding
the text of substantive investor rights. It may also include:
(1) specific defenses, exclusions and non-precluded
measures in the text of treaties, (2) clear guidance to tribunals as to how they must interpret the substantive text of the
treaty, (3) express statements about procedural matters,
including any requirements about pleading damages with
specificity in the request for arbitration or articulating the
methodology for calculating damages, (4) identification and
definition of the values that underlie that interpretive guidance, such as sustainable development, or (5) an express
prioritization of the rights contained in the treaty. In other
words, States should consider how best to recapture their
own discretion and then precisely outsource discretion
granted to arbitrators. This, in turn, offers arbitrators a
greater decree of guidance as to how they should and must
apply the law. It also sets the expectations of stakeholders
before, during and after the dispute.
A higher degree of specificity in the text of treaties is not
the only answer. Much like NAFTA Free Trade Commissions,34 States may derive value in constituting an inter-State
panel or other agency that is delegated the task of providing
greater provision about the meaning and application of
33 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); see also Anne van Aaken, International Investment Law
Between Commitment and Flexibility: A Contract Theory Analysis, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L.
507 (2009); Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49 (2007); Daniel Bodansky, Rules vs. Standards in International Environmental Law, 98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 275 (2004); Joel P.
Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 333 (1999);
John Braithwaite & Valerie Braithwaite, The Politics of Legalism: Rules versus
Standards in Nursing Home Regulation, 4 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 307 (1995); Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685
(1976).
34 See supra note 23 (examining the ability of NAFTA’s Free Trade Commission to engage in interpretive rulemaking, in clarifying the meaning of the
treaty).
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international investment law. Overall, the objective of such
formal rulemaking and the codification of international
investment law will avoid delegation problems, decrease the
risk of principal-agent problems and provide clarity to manage stakeholder expectations.
D. Informal Rulemaking and Informal Adjudication
The other critical untapped opportunities are related to
informal regulation. Simply using the term “informal” does
not mean that such regulatory conduct is completely without reference to standards. Rather, it would simply provide
an opportunity to offer regulation but without the comprehensive formality of treaty negotiation and ratification.35
Such informal activity could include, for example, informal
rulemaking and informal adjudication.36
In the context of informal rulemaking, one might imagine the creation of a Lead Government Agency (LGA) within
a host State that has been delegated the task of keeping the
State in compliance with its international law obligations.
Such an LGA might even consider how best to create rules
and internal protocols that are designed to facilitate conflict,
as well as manage and promote dispute prevention.37 Like35 The ideas in this essay are preliminary and would require additional details so as to avoid problems such as an entity being deemed to have
impermissibly amending a treaty through their own regulatory authority.
36 Another benefit of informal regulation involves the minimization of
“regulatory fatigue” that is created by more formal processes. See Richard B.
Stewart, Administrative Law in the 21st Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 446-47
(2003).
37 See Anna Joubin-Bret & Jan Knörich, Investor-State Disputes: Prevention
and Alternatives to Arbitration, UNCTAD SERIES ON INT’L INV. POLICIES FOR DEV. 1,
77–79 (2010), http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia200911_en.pdf [hereinafter ADR I] (examining the program launched by the Ministry of Commerce and
the Government of Columbia creating a lead agency that would be the centralized authority for all matters related to investor-State disputes); Jae Hoon Kim,
Republic of Korea's Development of a Better Investor-State Dispute Resolution System,
UNCTAD, INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES: PREVENTION AND ALTERNATIVES TO ARBITRATION
II
at
67,
69–70
(2011),
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20108_en.pdf [hereinafter ADR II]
(explaining how the Republic of Korea’s efforts included the formation of a
committee which is responsible for establishing policies regarding investment
treaties); id. at 97 (elaborating on the Republic of Korea’s creation of the Foreign
Investment Promotion Law whose Article 1 established The Office of the Foreign
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wise, although possibly more formal, this might also take
the form of negotiated rulemaking to bring together different stakeholder groups to fashion rules or investment law
guidance. These options can aid in the preservation of State
discretion and “policy space,” the promotion of State regulatory flexibility and the creation of opportunities to provide
legal clarity.
In the context of informal adjudication, there are a myriad of options. Whether in the form of an LGA or an
Ombuds office, it is possible to create an entity that helps
resolve investment conflicts informally and prevents them
from becoming full-blown formal disputes. This could take
the form of, for example, Early Neutral Evaluation, Expert
Determination, Evaluative Mediation or other less formalized conflict management mechanisms. The United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development has already identified early successes in this area38 as it permits flexibility and
the retention of State “policy space.” With the requisite
degree of capacity building and protocols, it may be possible
to move beyond formal adjudication to a more nuanced
approach to the regulation of international investment law.
One size may not fit all when it comes to the regulation
of international investment. Overreliance on formal adjudication breeds dissatisfaction, particularly where the
regulatory question can be addressed more directly and
effectively through an alternative process. To manage expecInvestment Ombudsman with the purpose of resolving issues faced by foreigninvested companies in Korea); id. at 63 (developing four areas for States to
evolve including, “(1) putting trained officials into central posts of the administration, (2) implementing mandatory consultations, (3) establishing new types
of investment treaty practice and (4) implementing continuing legal education of
civil servants in investment related matters”).
38	
   See ADR I, supra note 37, at 68–74 (examining, in detail, how Peru has
set up a government agency to distribute information on IIA's to their governmental agencies, including the creation of an alert system, as well as
standardizing information and responses to potential and actual IIA disputes);
id. at 88–93 (discussing how the Republic of Korea set up an independent
ombudsman program to monitor IIA's, and assist foreign investors in navigating
Korea's business environment, while working to increase the overall investment
environment); see also ADR II, supra note 37, at 97 (giving additional historical
background on the development of the Republic of Korea's ombudsman program, and explaining some of the remarkable success the program has
experienced).
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tations better and maximize the value of investment regulation, more than one process may be necessary. Perhaps
more likely, a series of processes may be essential to promote a nuanced use of regulatory authority while propromoting choice and values of procedural justice.
V.	
  CONCLUSION	
  	
  
This nuanced approach to managing the regulatory process, and a recognition that international investment will not
have a positive result for all stakeholders all the time, can
help to manage expectations related to international investment. In turn, this can start to alleviate dissatisfaction with
the system and promote a more realistic and balanced basis
for regulating international investment.
Overall, the international investment system is neither
wholly evil nor wholly good. False dichotomies and overly
simplistic characterizations hide the complexity of international investment and promotes an overreliance on
inaccurate caricatures. Rather, an evidence-based nuanced
analysis is preferable. This permits consideration of specific
dynamics about stakeholder objectives in light of particularized cost-benefit analysis of an individual IIA regime. This
should promote informed choices about where regulatory
discretion is best placed and avoid distortion caused by
inadvertent cognitive biases. The ultimate goal is to use a
flexible and nuanced approach to regulatory choices to
foster a more realistic assessment and utilization of the
international investment regime.
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